








Source		The most important events of the period 01/02/2024 - 15/02/2024	Autor : Ion Radu, lector AS Financial Markets
1	1	 Emerging trends and risks	
2	1	FINCEN [13/February/2023] FINCEN Use of Convertible Virtual Currency for Suspected Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Human Trafficking The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Financial Trend Analysis (FTA) reflecting an increase in Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting associated with the use of convertible virtual currency (CVC) and online child sexual exploitation (OCSE) and human trafficking. This FTA is based on BSA reporting filed between January 2020 and December 2021. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FTA_Human_Trafficking_FINAL508.pdf	
3	1	FINCEN [01/February/2024] Alert on Israeli Extremist Settler Violence Against Palestinians in the West Bank U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an alert related to the financing of Israeli extremist settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. The alert provides select red flags to assist financial institutions in identifying and reporting suspicious activity that finances such violence. While the alert highlights the potential involvement of certain nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in facilitating payments to fund violence in the West Bank, FinCEN continues to emphasize that legitimate charities should have access to financial services and can transmit funds through legitimate and transparent channels. FinCEN is also reminding financial institutions to apply a risk-based approach to Customer Due Diligence (CDD) requirements when developing the risk profiles of charities and other non-profit customers. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN_Alert_Extremist_Violence_FINAL_2.1.24.pdf	
4	1	Price Cap Coalition [01/February/2024] The EU and Price Cap Coalition members issue a compliance & enforcement alert European Union, together with the other G7+ Price Cap Coalition members issued a compliance and enforcement alert to further enhance the collective action taken to tackle the oil price cap (OPC) evasion attempts. The Price Cap Coalition takes a proactive compliance and enforcement approach that includes supporting governments and industry stakeholders to improve their compliance with the OPC, identifying suspected evasion and breaches of the OPC, and taking robust enforcement action where necessary. This alert includes an overview of key OPC evasion methods and recommendations for identifying such methods https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/44e45d8b-b225-4469-8722-fdcbe653c7cf_en?filename=240201-alert-opc-coalition-compliance-enforcement_en.pdf	
5	2	 Warnings and reports, thematic analyzes of national and international authorities	
6	2	UK FCA [08/February/2024] Reducing and preventing financial crime UK FCA has identified 4 areas where further collaborative action can help shift the dial decisively on reducing and preventing financial crime. These areas also pose questions for regulated firms and their boards (or equivalent governing body) to consider, to help slow down fraud and reduce money laundering. https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/corporate-documents/reducing-and-preventing-financial-crime#f-chapter-id-summary-of-impact-2022-23	
7	2	FINCEN [07/February/2024] Rulemaking to Increase Transparency in Residential Real Estate U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to combat and deter money laundering in the U.S. residential real estate sector by increasing transparency. The proposed rule would require certain professionals involved in real estate closings and settlements to report information to FinCEN about non-financed transfers of residential real estate to legal entities or trusts. FinCEN's proposal is tailored to target residential real estate transfers considered to be high-risk for money laundering, while minimizing potential business burden, and it would not require reporting of transfers made to individuals. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/RRE_NPRM_FactSheet_FINAL_02.06.24_508.pdf	

8	2	FATF	<p>[02/February/2024] FATF Annual Report 2022-2023</p> <p>The FATF Annual Report 2022-2023 sets out the achievement of the FATF to deliver on its mandate and strategic priorities to prevent criminals, the corrupt and terrorists from abusing the international financial system and strengthen the foundations for sustainable and more inclusive economic development.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/FATF-Annual-Report-2022-2023.pdf.coredownload.pdf</p>
9	3		<p>Terrorism and International Sanctions updates</p>
10	3	US	<p>OFAC-Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf</p> <p>OFAC-Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/ssi/ssilist.pdf</p> <p>OFAC-List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List) https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/capta/captalist.pdf</p>
11	3	EU	<p>European Union Consolidated Financial Sanctions Lis https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fsd/fsf/public/files/pdfFullSanctionsList/content?token=n002g3ky</p> <p>https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/consolidated-list-of-persons-groups-and-entities-subject-to-eu-financial-sanctions?locale=en</p>
12	3	UN	<p>United Nations Security Council Consolidated List https://scsanctions.un.org/consolidated/</p>
13	3	US	<p>[15/February/2024] OFAC - Publication of Regulatory Amendment to the North Korea Sanctions Regulations; Issuance of North Korea-related Frequently Asked Questions</p> <p>The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending the North Korea Sanctions Regulations to amend or add general licenses to facilitate certain humanitarian-related and journalistic activities. Specifically, OFAC is amending an existing general license for nongovernmental organizations and adding general licenses to authorize certain transactions related to the exportation and re-exportation of items authorized by the U.S. Department of Commerce: the provision of certain agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices; and certain journalistic activities in North Korea.</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932616/download?inline</p>
14	3	US	<p>[14/February/2024] Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designation</p> <p>The SDN* list has been updated (added) with 3 individuals and 4 entities related to procurement network responsible for facilitating the illegal export of goods and technology from over two dozen U.S. companies to end-users in Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), which is designated for its role in providing financial support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah.</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240214</p>

15	3	EU	<p>[14/February/2024] COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/577 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2024/576 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine</p> <p>Clarifications regarding the prohibition of transactions related to the management of reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia, as well as to introduce further measures. The Council decided that Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) holding more than €1 million of Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assets must account extraordinary cash balances accumulating due to EU restrictive measures separately and must also keep corresponding revenues separate. In addition, CSDs shall be prohibited from disposing of the ensuing net profits. In view of risks and costs related to holding of the assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia, each central security depository may request its supervisory authority to authorise a release of a share of those net profits in view of complying with statutory capital and risk management requirements.</p> <p>https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/12/immobilised-russian-assets-council-decides-to-set-aside-extraordinary-revenues/</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024D0577</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R0576</p>
16	3	US	<p>[08/February/2024] Russia-related Designations</p> <p>The SDN* list has been updated (added) with 1 vessel and 4 entities from Liberia and UAE</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240208</p>
17	3	US	<p>[08/February/2024] US Prohibitions Related to Imports of Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds of Russian Federation Origin and Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Exported From the Russian Federation</p> <p>The importation and entry into the United States, including importation for admission into a foreign trade zone located in the United States, of diamond jewelry and unsorted diamonds of Russian Federation origin and diamond jewelry and unsorted diamonds exported from the Russian Federation is prohibited.</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932606/download?inline</p>
18	3	US	<p>[07/February/2024] Counter Narcotics Designations; Russia-related Designation Removal</p> <p>The SDN* list has been updated (added) with 1 individual and 1 entity Ecuador's most violent gangs, Los Choneros, and its leader, José Adolfo Macías Villamar (also known by the alias "Fito")</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240207</p>
19	3	US	<p>[02/February/2024] Iran-related Designations and Designations Updates; Counter Terrorism Designations and Designations Updates; Non-Proliferation Designations</p> <p>The SDN* list has been updated (added) with 5 individuals and 5 entities related to key procurement network of prolific suppliers of materials and sensitive technology for Iran's ballistic missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs ; and related to Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC)</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240202</p>

20	3	US	<p>[01/February/2024] West Bank-related Designations</p> <p>The SDN* list has been updated (added) with 4 individuals from Israel</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240201</p>
21	3	US	<p>[01/February/2024] New Executive Order</p> <p>Executive Order 14115 Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank.</p> <p>https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932576/download?inline</p>
22	3	EU	<p>[02/February/2024] COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/457 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/254 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Guatemala COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/455 implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/287 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Guatemala</p> <p>5 persons have been added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/287.</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024D0457</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R0455</p>
23	4		EU ML/TF SupraNational Risk Assessment
24	4	EBA	<p>EBA Opinion on money laundering and terrorist financing risks across the EU was published on [13/July/2023]</p> <p>https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/Publications/Opinions/2023/1058335/EBA%20Op%202023%2008%20Opinion%20on%20MLTF%20risks%20EBA%20REP%202023%2021.pdf</p>
25	4	EU	<p>The EU report of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities (EU SNRA) was issued on [27/October/2022]</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0354</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022SC0344</p>
26	5		Information and assessments by national authorities on risks at national level
27	5	US	<p>[07/February/2024] US 2024 National Risk Assessments for Money Laundering</p> <p>https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-National-Money-Laundering-Risk-Assessment.pdf</p>
28	5	US	<p>[07/February/2024] US 2024 National Risk Assessments for Terrorist Financing</p> <p>https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-National-Terrorist-Financing-Risk-Assessment.pdf</p>


29	5	US	<p>[07/February/2024] US 2024 National Risk Assessments for Proliferation Financing</p> <p>https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-National-Proliferation-Financing-Risk-Assessment.pdf</p>
30	5	ROMANIA	<p>The main findings and conclusions of the Romania ML/TF National Risk Assessment (NRA) was published on [22/November/2022]</p> <p>RO: http://www.onpcsb.ro/pdf/Rezumat%20NRA%20Public.pdf</p> <p>EN: http://www.onpcsb.ro/pdf/Summary%20of%20the%20National%20Risk%20Assessment%20Report%20on%20Money%20Laundering%20and%20Terrorism%20Financing.pdf</p>
31	6		Specific guidelines, guides, instructions or warnings
32	6	EU	<p>[06/February/2023] European Commission updated numerous FAQs related to the Russia sanctions regime.</p> <p>The updates cover:</p> <p>06 February 2024 : Software</p> <p>26 January 2024 : Oil price cap</p> <p>26 January 2024 : Public procurement</p> <p>https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine/frequently-asked-questions-sanctions-against-russia_en</p> <p>https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/66e8fd7d-8057-4b9b-96c2-5e54bf573cd1_en?filename=fags-sanctions-russia-consolidated_en.pdf</p>
33	6	NZ	<p>[01/February/2024] Compliance, due diligence and understanding evasion risk in the Russia sanctions context</p> <p>This guide raises awareness about the risks of sanction evasion, and describes measures that can be taken to avoid activities that may undermine sanctions efforts. This guidance provides information about what due diligence may be required to avoid breaching Russia sanctions. It describes what a risk-based approach is, and when and how due diligence measures have to be implemented. It explains how associates, relatives and exporters are sometimes used to circumvent sanctions, and provides examples of common red flags to help spot attempts to evade sanctions.</p> <p>https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Countries-and-Regions/Europe/Ukraine/Guidance-Russia-Sanctions-Act-and-Regulations-Due-diligence.pdf</p>
34	7		Warnings, fines and convictions for violating the KYC/AML/CTF/FiSa/Compliance legislation in financial market
35	7	ASF	<p>[01/February/2024] S.A.I. Globinvest S.A. fined 35.000 RON</p> <p>By Decision no. 85/30.01.2024 ASF established the following:</p> <p>1/breaches of AML/CTF legislation regarding customer due diligence measures</p> <p>2/breaches of the international sanctions ASF regulation</p> <p>https://asfromania.ro/uploads/articole/attachments/655bb46e16928657993764.pdf</p>
36	7	FINCEN	<p>[01/February/2024] FinCEN Assesses \$100,000 Civil Money Penalty against Gyanendra Kumar Asre for Violations of the Bank Secrecy Act</p> <p>United States Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) assessed a \$100,000 civil money penalty on Gyanendra Kumar Asre (Asre) for willful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its implementing regulations. FinCEN's action also imposes a five-year ban on Asre's participation in the conduct of the affairs of any financial institution subject to the BS. Asre admitted to willfully violating the BSA. Asre failed to register his money services business (MSB) with FinCEN and, in his capacity as the BSA Compliance Officer of a credit union, failed to maintain an effective AML program and failed to detect and report suspicious transactions. During Asre's tenure as BSA Compliance Officer, the credit union's risk profile drastically increased, including by providing services to Asre's unregistered MSB. Despite these elevated risks, Asre failed to implement adequate AML controls. As a result, hundreds of millions of dollars in high-risk and suspicious funds—including substantial bulk cash deposits—moved through the credit union without proper monitoring or reporting to FinCEN.</p> <p>https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-assesses-100000-civil-money-penalty-against-gyanendra-kumar-asre</p>

37	7	USOCC	<p>[01/February/2024] OCC Assesses \$65 Million Penalty Against City National Bank</p> <p>The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) assessed a \$65 million civil money penalty against City National Bank, of Los Angeles, California, related to systemic deficiencies in the Bank's risk management and internal controls. The OCC found that the bank engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, including its failure to establish effective risk management and internal controls. The agency also issued a cease-and-desist order requiring the bank to take broad and comprehensive corrective actions to improve its strategic plan, operational risk management, including internal controls; compliance risk management, including BSA/anti-money laundering and fair lending; strategic risk management; and investment management practices.</p> <p>https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2024/nr-occ-2024-8.html</p>
38	8		<p>Law enforcement actions for money laundering and international sanctions crimes</p>
39	8	USDOJJ	<p>[09/February/2024] Former CEO Sentenced to Prison for COVID-19 Relief Fraud and Money Laundering</p> <p>Gregory Scott Keough, 57, of Wellington, Florida, was sentenced to 30 months in prison for submitting fraudulent loan applications seeking approximately \$2 million in forgivable Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) and Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. These loans are guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA) under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).</p> <p>https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/former-ceo-sentenced-prison-covid-19-relief-fraud-and-money-laundering</p>
40	8	USDOJ	<p>[07/February/2024] Charges and Arrest in Two Separate Illicit Technology Transfer Schemes to Benefit Governments of China and Iran</p> <p>In two separate cases out of U.S. Attorneys' Offices on opposite coasts, several individuals are charged – one of whom was arrested – in connection with sophisticated schemes to transfer sensitive technology, goods, and information for the benefit of hostile foreign adversaries, in violation of U.S. law. In the Eastern District of New York, two Iranian nationals are charged with conspiring to export equipment used in the aerospace industry to the Government of Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), in connection with an alleged conspiracy to illegally export U.S. goods and technology without the required licenses. In the Central District of California, a man was arrested for allegedly stealing trade secrets developed for use by the U.S. government to detect nuclear missile launches and track ballistic and hypersonic missiles.</p> <p>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-and-arrest-two-separate-illicit-technology-transfer</p>
41	8	USDOJ	<p>[02/February/2024] Terrorism and Sanctions-Evasion Charges and Seizures Linked to Illicit, Billion-Dollar Global Oil Trafficking Network That Finances Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Its Malign Activities</p> <p>The Justice Department announced the unsealing of three federal cases, across two U.S. Attorneys' Offices, as the most recent in a series of efforts to combat the illicit trafficking of Iranian oil that funds Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Iran's primary mechanism for cultivating and providing lethal support to terrorist organizations abroad. Seven defendants, including a leader within Iran's IRGC and officers of a Turkish energy group, are charged with terrorism, sanctions-evasion, fraud, and money laundering offenses in connection with their trafficking and selling of Iranian oil to government-affiliated buyers in China, Russia, and Syria, in order to finance the IRGC-QF. Additionally, the United States seized \$108 million used as part of these defendants' scheme to fund the IRGC-QF.</p> <p>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-terrorism-and-sanctions-evasion-charges-and-seizures-linked</p>
42	8	USDOJ	<p>[01/February/2024] Chinese Nationals Charged with Illegally Exporting U.S.-Origin Electronic Components to Iran and Iranian Military</p> <p>Four Chinese nationals were charged with various federal crimes related to a years-long conspiracy to unlawfully export and smuggle U.S.-origin electronic components from the United States to Iran. According to court documents, 4 individuals, unlawfully exported and smuggled U.S. export controlled items through China and Hong Kong ultimately for the benefit of entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which supervises Iran's development and production of missiles, weapons, and military aerial equipment to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).</p> <p>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-nationals-charged-illegally-exporting-us-origin-electronic-components-iran-and</p>

43	8	USDOJ	<p>[01/February/2024] U.K. Citizen Sentenced to Prison for Attempting to Export U.S. Technology to Iran</p> <p>Saber Fakhri, 48, of the United Kingdom, was sentenced yesterday to 18 months in prison for violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. According to his plea agreement, Saber Fakhri conspired with Bader Fakhri, 43, of Canada, Altaf Faquih, 72, of the United Arab Emirates, and Alireza Taghavi, 48, of Iran, to export and attempt to export an Industrial Microwave System (IMS) and counter-drone system from the United States to Iran, without first obtaining the requisite license from the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).</p> <p>https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/uk-citizen-sentenced-18-months-prison-attempt-procure-high-powered-microwave-system-iran</p>
44	8	USDOJ	<p>[01/February/2024] Man Pleads Guilty to Bank Secrecy Act Charges in \$1B Scheme</p> <p>A New York man pleaded guilty today to failure to maintain an anti-money laundering program in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act as part of a scheme to bring lucrative and high-risk international financial business to a small, unsophisticated credit union.</p> <p>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/man-pleads-guilty-bank-secrecy-act-charges-1b-scheme</p>
45	9		Threats, alerts and typologies
46			Nothing relevant during this period
47	10		Corruption Perception Indices and Country Reports
48	10	Transparency International	<p>2023 Corruption Perceptions Index has been released on [30/January/2024]</p> <p>The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was published by Transparency International. The global average remains unchanged for over a decade at just 43 out of 100. More than two-thirds of countries score below 50, while 23 countries have fallen to their lowest scores yet. Here is the score for some relevant countries from each risk class : Denmark 90(=) ranked first; Austria 71(=); Lithuania 61(=); Malta 51(=); Romania 46(4=); Moldova 42(+3); Pakistan 29(+2); Somalia 11(-1) ranked last. The average score of Western Europe&EU is 65, with max Denmark 90(=) and min Hungary 42(=). The biggest changes have been registered by Afghanistan 20 dropped the most (-4) and Egypt 35 increased the most (+5).</p> <p>https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI-2023-Report.pdf</p>
49	11		Mutual evaluation reports or lists of states or jurisdictions that have KYC/AML/CTF deficiencies
50	11	FATF	<p>[14/February/2024] FATF consolidated countries assessment ratings</p> <p>This table provides an up-to-date overview of the FATF ratings that assessed countries obtained for effectiveness and technical compliance with the 40 recommendations.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Assessment-ratings.html</p>
51	11	FATF	<p>[14/February/2024] Cuba's progress in strengthening measures against money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>This follow-up report analyses the progress made by Cuba in addressing the technical compliance deficiencies identified in its MER. Cuba has made some progress in addressing its technical compliance deficiencies and as such: Recommendation 15 has been re-rated from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant. Based on the approved follow-up procedures for the Fourth Round, as well as the Road Map in preparation for the Fifth Round of Mutual Evaluations, Cuba concludes its Fourth-Round follow-up with this report.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-fur/GAFILAT-Cuba-ENG-2024.pdf.coredownload.pdf</p>



52	11	FATF	<p>[12/February/2024] Costa Rica continues to strengthen measures against money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>Overall, Costa Rica continues to make significant progress in addressing the technical compliance issues identified in its MER. However, there are still minor deficiencies in the implementation of the requirements in some Recommendations and these have been re-rated as follows: Recommendation 17 from Partially Compliant to Compliant. Recommendation 22 from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant Recommendation 28 from Non-Compliant to Largely Compliant This report concludes the enhanced follow-up of Costa Rica for the Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations, in accordance with the approved procedures and in line with GAFILAT's roadmap for the preparation of the Fifth Round of Mutual Evaluations.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-fur/GAFILAT-Costa-Rica-2024.pdf.coredownload.pdf</p>
53	11	FATF	<p>[09/February/2024] Bolivia's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>Bolivia understanding of its TF risks is lower. In some cases, the understanding of the ML/TF risks has not been enhanced at the practical and operational levels. Access to beneficial ownership information in an adequate and accurate manner presents some limitations, due to the inter-agency cooperation, the different regulations and control agencies involved. Commercial companies keep records and keep beneficial ownership information; however, the assessment team (AT) could not conclude that all the information is timely updated.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/Bolivia-GAFILAT-MER-2023.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf</p>
54	11	FATF	<p>[08/February/2024] Saint Vincent & the Grenadines' measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>SVG has a good understanding of the ML/TF risks for the sectors that have been subject to ML/TF risk assessment. However, sectoral risk assessments have not yet been completed for VASPs, MPSPs and FAs/FMs, and there was no separate consideration of foreign predicate offences while assessing threats and vulnerabilities. The AT nevertheless considers these deficiencies minor, given there are only twelve (12) FAs/FMs, one (1) MPSP and no VASPs identified in the jurisdiction, FAs/FMs and MPSPs are licensed and subject to oversight by the FSA, and a significant majority of LEA ML actions and activities in SVG relate to domestic predicate offences.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/St-Vincent-Grenadines-MER.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf</p>
55	11	FATF	<p>[08/February/2024] Lesotho's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>Lesotho has demonstrated an understanding of its ML risks to some extent. It has identified corruption, fraud and forgery, and tax crimes as the major proceeds- generating crimes. However, there is limited and uneven understanding of TF risks. The NRA has not been updated. However, CBL conducted a sectoral risk assessment for the banking sector, which provides an updated understanding.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/Lesotho-ESAAMLG-MER-2023.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf</p>
56	11	FATF	<p>[05/February/2024] Montenegro's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>The competent authorities demonstrated a reasonable understanding on how ML occurs in Montenegro. The risk understanding of some important ML threats and vulnerabilities needs to be enhanced. The AML/CFT strategic action plans address the identified ML/TF risks to a large extent, however a number of actions are still pending. Most of the key authorities could articulate a clear view on TF threats and vulnerabilities and demonstrated a good level of cooperation. Domestic coordination and cooperation has been demonstrated amongst the competent authorities.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/Montenegro-Moneyval-MER-2024.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf</p>

57	11	FATF	<p>[01/February/2024] Saint Lucia's progress in the combat against money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>Saint Lucia remains partially compliant with Recommendation 15 and 38. Saint Lucia has 30 Recommendations rated C/LC</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-fur/Saint%20Lucia-CFATF-4mer-3fur-.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf</p>
58	11	FATF	<p>[01/February/2024] Nepal's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>Nepal competent authorities and the private sector have a varied and developing understanding of ML risks and a limited understanding of TF risk. The National Coordination Committee (NCC) is overseeing Nepal's national AML/CFT policies and implementation, which are focused on strengthening Nepal's AML/CFT legislative frameworks and institutions, building the capacity of relevant competent authorities, and operational activities targeting Nepal's highest threats and vulnerabilities. However, high level commitment, greater resources, operational-level prioritisation, and cooperation is needed for Nepal to effectively combat its ML and TF risks.</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/Nepal-APG-MER-2023.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf</p>
59	11	FATF	<p>[01/February/2024] Guinea's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing</p> <p>The effective and efficient implementation of the AML/CFT regime in Guinea is fundamentally limited by the low banking rate in the economy, the predominant use of cash, the pre-eminence of the informal sector, the vastness of the land borders and prevalent corruption. The overall understanding of money laundering and terrorist financing risks in Guinea is poor. The prevention of terrorism and its financing is not the subject of any appropriate national policy and strategy.</p> <p>www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/GIABA-MER-Guinea-2023.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf</p>
60	11	EU	<p>The EU list of high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies has been updated on [18/January/2024]</p> <p>The Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 regarding high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies has been updated by C.D.Reg. 2024/163 as follows: Cayman Island and Jordan exit ; NO entries:</p> <p>The list contains 27 countries : 1/Afghanistan(2016) 2/South Africa (2023) 3/Barbados(2020) 4/Burkina Faso(2022) 5/Cameroon(2023) 6/D.R.Congo(2023) 7/Filipine(2022) 8/Gibraltar(2023) 9/Haiti(2022) 10/Jamaica(2020) 11/Mali(2022) 12/Myanmar(2020) 13/Mozambique(2023) 14/Nigeria(2023) 15/Panama(2020) 16/Senegal(2022) 17/Syria(2016) 18/South Sudan(2022) 19/Trinidad and Tobago(2018) 20/Tanzania (2023) 21/Uganda(2016) 22/Vanuatu(2016) 23/Vietnam(2023) 24/Yemen(2016) 25/United Arab Emirates(2023) 26/Iran(2016) 27/D.P.R.Korea(2016)</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1675</p> <p>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R0163</p>

61	11	FATF	<p>FATF lists have been updated on [27/October/2023]</p> <p>FATF has reviewed and published :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the lists of jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action(BLACK), list remained unchanged : North Korea; Iran; Myanmar; - list of jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring(GREY), the updates are: Albania, Cayman I, Jordan and Panama exit; enter in the list : Bulgaria. The grey list contains 23 countries : 1/Barbados 2/ Bulgaria 4/Burkina Faso 3/Cameroon 4/Congo D.R. 5/Croatia 6/Gibraltar 7/Haiti 8/Jamaica 9/Mali 10/Mozambique 11/Nigeria 12/Panama 13/Philippines 14/Senegal 15/South Africa 16/South Sudan 17/Syria 18/Tanzania 19/Turcia 20/Uganda 21/United Arab Emirates 22/Vietnam 23/Yemen <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-october-2023.html</p> <p>https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Call-for-action-october-2023.html</p>
62	11	EU	<p>EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes has been updated on [17/October/2023]</p> <p>The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes has been updated. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize and Seychelles were added, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica and Marshall Islands were removed. The black list contains the following countries: 1/ American Samoa 2/ Anguila 3/ Antigua & Barbuda 4/ Bahamas 5/ Belize 6/ Fiji 7/ Guam 8/ Palau 9/ Panama 10/ Rusia 11/ Samoa 12/ Seychelles 13/ Trinidad & Tobago 14/ Turk & Caicos I. 15/ US Virgin I. 16/ Vanuatu For the grey list see Annex II</p> <p>https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/67379/st13879-en23.pdf</p>
63	11	Moneyval	<p>Romania MONEYVAL Mutual Evaluation Report [18/July/2023]</p> <p>The report provides a comprehensive assessment of the country's level of compliance with standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). MONEYVAL notes that Romania has achieved moderate levels of effectiveness in all areas assessed except for international cooperation, where it has achieved a substantial level of effectiveness and has been commended by other countries for its constructive assistance.</p> <p>MONEYVAL's mutual evaluation of Romania highlights that the country demonstrates a fair understanding of ML risks and, to a lesser degree, of TF risks. Romania needs to immediately start implementing mitigating actions that target the highest risks to which the country is exposed.</p> <p>https://rm.coe.int/moneyval-2023-5-mer-romania/1680abfd1c</p>
64	12		Relevant information from credible and reliable organizations
65		UK RUSI	<p>[07/February/2024] Time to Act: Mobilising EU Sanctions against Facilitators of Circumvention</p> <p>The EU needs a step change in its approach to sanctioning third-party actors that it reasonably suspects of facilitating the circumvention of Russia sanctions.</p> <p>https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/time-act-mobilising-eu-sanctions-against-facilitators-circumvention</p>
66	13		Information from statistical organizations and academia & others
67			Nothing of relevance during this time period
68	14		Relevant information on ML/FT risks from mass - media

69	14	Mass-media	<p>[15/February/2024] Ukraine refuses to take Raiffeisen off Russia war blacklist</p> <p>Ukraine has refused to remove Raiffeisen Bank International , opens new tab from a "sponsors of war" blacklist, challenging the biggest Western bank in Russia to sever its ties to Moscow. In a letter sent to Raiffeisen earlier this month, which was seen by Reuters, Ukrainian officials questioned what the bank was doing to leave Russia, saying much of its plans were vague and incomplete. The correspondence ratchets up pressure on one of Austria's largest banks and adds to tensions between Kyiv and Austria, whose political leaders are also lobbying to have Raiffeisen taken off the list, having earlier secured a temporary suspension.</p> <p>https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/ukraine-refuses-take-raiffeisen-off-russia-war-blacklist-2024-02-15/</p>
70	14	Mass-media	<p>[14/February/2024] Serbian Appeals Court Orders Retrial In Money Laundering Case Against Ukrainian Ex-Spy</p> <p>Serbian Appeals Court Orders Retrial In Money Laundering Case Against Ukrainian Ex-Spy. Naumov denied the money-laundering charges, telling the court that 608,000 euros (\$653,000) and \$125,000 found in his car during the arrest was "family money" and intended to pay for a move to Istanbul. Two diamonds were also found in his possession. Naumov has been charged in Ukraine with embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, fraud, and other charges related to the handling of state funds.</p> <p>https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-ukrainian-naumov-money-laundering-retrial/32819571.html</p>
71	14	Mass-media	<p>[13/February/2024] Swiss prosecutors reportedly probing Russia sanctions breaches</p> <p>Two commodity trading firms based in the Alpine nation are alleged to have bypassed sanctions on Russia via subsidiaries abroad. The suspicion which has been circulating for some time has been confirmed: commodity trading companies are said to have circumvented Swiss sanctions against Russia by means of subsidiaries, based for example in the United Arab Emirates or other Gulf states.</p> <p>https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/multinational-companies/swiss-prosecutors-reportedly-probing-russia-sanctions-breaches/72527163</p>
72	14	Mass-media	<p>[10/February/2024] UN experts investigating 58 suspected North Korean cyberattacks valued at about \$3 billion</p> <p>U.N. experts say they are investigating 58 suspected North Korean cyberattacks between 2017 and 2023 valued at approximately \$3 billion, with the money reportedly being used to help fund its development of weapons of mass destruction. And the high volume of cyberattacks by North Korean hacking groups who report to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea's primary foreign intelligence organization, is reportedly continuing, the panel of experts said in the executive summary of a new report to the U.N. Security Council.</p> <p>https://apnews.com/article/un-experts-north-korea-cyberattacks-nuclear-sanctions-8e84703049dfb4fda011829115777c9e</p>
73	14	Mass-media	<p>[09/February/2024] Hamburg bank suspected as 'financial hub' for Iranian terror</p> <p>A small Hamburg bank was at the center of a clandestine financial network Iran relied on for years to funnel money to its terror proxies in the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Yemen's Houthi rebels, officials from two western intelligence agencies say. Islamic Republic was using Varengold Bank AG to fund its terror affiliates, leading to a sweeping investigation that has forced the bank to all but shut down its commercial banking operations.</p> <p>https://www.politico.eu/article/hamburg-bank-suspected-as-financial-hub-for-iranian-terror/</p>
74	14	Mass-media	<p>[08/February/2024] Ex-Aon Singapore CEO handed more bribery charges involving S\$668,000; allegedly used criminal proceeds to buy landed property</p> <p>A former chief executive officer of Aon Singapore, Collin Chiew, was on Thursday (Feb 8) charged with obtaining S\$668,000 in bribes while he headed the insurance firm, and later as a director at another insurer. The bribes were allegedly paid by three individuals linked to Fullerton Healthcare Group (FHG), a company that operates several clinics in Singapore.</p> <p>https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/ex-aon-singapore-ceo-handed-more-bribery-charges-involving-s668000-allegedly-used-criminal-proceeds-buy-landed-property-2358746</p>

75	14	Mass-media	<p>[07/February/2024] ING Says Faces New Legal Case Over Laundering Settlement</p> <p>ING said it has been summoned by investors claiming to have lost millions of euros after the Dutch banking giant paid a settlement in a criminal probe five-and-a-half years ago. Amsterdam-based ING paid Dutch prosecutors 775 million euros (\$835 million) to settle a laundering probe in 2018, after it failed to ensure that clients were not hiding cash for illegal purposes in its accounts.</p> <p>https://www.barrons.com/news/ing-says-faces-new-legal-case-over-laundering-settlement-39ab9479</p>
76	14	Mass-media	<p>[06/February/2024] Russia's Novatek sets up China office to market gas amid sanctions</p> <p>Russian natural gas producer Novatek , opens new tab is building a new China-based team to explore marketing the fuel, sources familiar with the plans said, as U.S. sanctions thwart plans for exports from its new multi-billion dollar Arctic project. The move illustrates Russian energy companies' continued pivot to Asia, especially China, after the Ukraine conflict cut off their access to markets in Europe. A China operation may help Novatek find customers for its newest liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, Arctic LNG 2, after U.S. sanctions were imposed. Novatek, Russia's largest LNG producer, has been building a Beijing-based business development and marketing team in recent months, six sources with knowledge of the matter said.</p> <p>https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-novatek-sets-up-china-office-market-gas-amid-sanctions-sources-2024-02-06</p>
77	14	Mass-media	<p>[05/February/2024] Russian oil getting into UK via refinery loophole, reports claim</p> <p>The UK is among many Western countries to ban the import of all oil and oil products that originate in Russia in a bid to hit the amount of cash Moscow can generate from fossil fuels. But two separate reports, shared exclusively with the BBC, suggest the rules on refining enable products made from Russian crude oil to arrive on UK soil. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) said this "refining loophole" meant countries such as India and China, who have not sanctioned the Kremlin, are able to legally import Russian crude and refine it into oil products such as jet fuel and diesel.</p> <p>https://www.bbc.com/news/business-68018660</p>
78	14	Mass-media	<p>[03/February/2024] How North Korean eyelashes make their way to West as 'made in China'</p> <p>Millions of dollars in sales of North Korean false eyelashes - marketed in beauty stores around the world as "made in China" - helped drive a recovery in the secretive state's exports last year. The processing and packaging of North Korean false eyelashes - openly conducted in neighbouring China, the country's largest trading partner - gives Kim Jong Un's regime a way to skirt international sanctions, providing a vital source of foreign currency.</p> <p>https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-north-korean-eyelashes-make-their-way-west-made-china-2024-02-03/</p>
79	14	Mass-media	<p>[02/February/2024] Danish court jails two people for laundering \$4.2bn</p> <p>A Danish court has found two people guilty of being part of a scheme to use Danske Bank A/S's unit in Estonia to launder as much as 29 billion kroner (€3.9 billion), the latest development in what was one of Europe's biggest dirty money scams. The Copenhagen City Court sentenced a woman to nine years of prison and a man to seven years, according to a ruling posted on Friday and linked to a verdict from 2022 in which a Lithuanian national was jailed for eight years. The two weren't identified by name. The woman operated as many as 40 companies out of Copenhagen, which all had accounts in Estonia and were owned by foreigners. The man acted as a dummy director in most of the firms. The court said the two were aware that transactions at the companies occurring from 2008 to 2016 possibly were acts of laundering.</p> <p>https://www.luxtimes.lu/businessandfinance/danish-court-jails-two-people-for-laundering-4.2bn/7976302.html</p>

80	14	Mass-media	<p>[01/February/2024] Putin ally Dmitry Ovsyannikov arrested in London on charge of breaching Russian sanctions</p> <p>Putin ally Dmitry Ovsyannikov arrested in London on charge of breaching Russian sanctions. An ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin has been arrested in London over money laundering charges. Dmitry Ovsyannikov, the former mayor of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea, was arrested by the National Crime Agency at his home last week on suspicion of sanctions breaches. He has been charged with seven counts of circumventing sanctions and two of money laundering and will appear before Southwark Crown Court on February 20. Mr Ovsyannikov is the first person to be charged in Britain with breaching Russian sanctions. He was sanctioned by Britain in 2020 and the European Union in 2017 after making public statements in support of the invasion of Crimea.</p> <p>https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/russia-dmitry-ovsyannikov-arrest-london-national-crime-agency-b1136339.html</p>
81	14	Mass-media	<p>[01/February/2024] Court orders bank to transfer Abramovich's funds to ZAKA</p> <p>Tel Aviv District Court Judge Yardena Seroussi ordered Mizrahi Tefahot Bank to transfer NIS 8 million from the account of businessman Roman Abramovich to ZAKA, an Israeli humanitarian organization. This decision came despite the bank's initial refusal due to EU and UK sanctions against Abramovich.</p> <p>https://www.ipost.com/israel-news/article-784347</p>
82	15		<p>Legislative initiatives and changes</p>
83	15	EU	<p>[07/February/2024] MEPs adopted new rules to ensure transferred funds arrive immediately into the bank accounts of retail customers and businesses across the EU.</p> <p>European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 February 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 260/2012 and (EU) 2021/1230 as regards instant credit transfers in euro.</p> <p>The regulations has not yet published in the Official Jurnal.</p> <p>https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17318/ensuring-euro-money-transfers-arrive-within-ten-seconds</p> <p>https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2022/0341(COD)&l=en</p> <p>https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0065_EN.pdf</p>
84	<p>Autor : Ion Radu  https://www.linkedin.com/in/ion-radu-aml/</p>		
85	<p>*) Note: all property and interests in property of the designated individuals and entities that are in the U.S. or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action.</p>		